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Introduction 
The term hermeneutics is derived from the name of the Greek god Hermes, 
the messenger of the gods. His position required that he translate the gods’ 
wishes to humans and report their responses to his divine colleagues. Gods 
and humans spoke different languages and had profoundly divergent 
worldviews, and so Hermes had to translate from one idiom into another. 
Interpretation was a central factor in his mission, and this is true of 
contemporary understandings of hermeneutics. Most actions involve some 
sort of interpretation, as do thoughts and beliefs, but hermeneutics is 
generally not simply conceived as interpretation per se, but rather is 
connected with theories of interpretation, the principles that allow 
conceptual understanding to emerge from sensory experience and cognitive 
activity. 
 The first usage of the term hermeneutics in Western literature was 
related to principles of scriptural interpretation. Scriptures are allusive, 
open to multiple readings, and contested between groups of exegetes and 
belief communities. Biblical hermeneutics attempts to provide rules and 
standards for exegesis. In recent times hermeneutics has been expanded in 
scope, and is commonly viewed as foundational to all the humanities and 
social sciences and as an aspect of all human thought and experience.  
 There is no exact equivalent term in Buddhism, nor has Buddhist 
interpretation theory been extended to the present range of Western 
versions of hermeneutics. Buddhist exegetes are primarily concerned with 
scriptural interpretation, much like the medieval Christians who first 
developed systems for understanding the Bible and other sacred writings. 
Buddhist hermeneutical treatises commonly focus on the intention 
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(abhipraya) behind scriptural statements, particularly in instances of conflict 
between texts or doctrines. One concern of Buddhist thinkers in India was 
distinguishing the authentic “word of the Buddha” (buddha-vacana) from 
spurious texts attributed to him. According to Buddhist tradition, shortly 
after the founder died some of his followers became concerned that new 
apocryphal works would begin to appear, and they wished both to forestall 
this and to develop a canon resistant to expansion.  
Hermeneutics in the Pāli Canon 
A “first council” was convened at Rājagṛha, headed by the great monk 
Mahākāśyapa and attended by 500 arhats (monks who had overcome all 
mental afflictions and whose memories and perceptions were untainted by 
bias or sectarianism), who recounted from memory oral discourses delivered 
by the Buddha during his forty-year ministry. His personal attendant 
Ānanda recited the sermons (Pāli: sutta; Sanskrit: sūtra) and Upāli recited 
the discourses relating to monastic discipline (vinaya). Later traditions 
claimed that Anuruddha recounted the higher doctrine (abhidharma), a 
collection of scholastic treatises that categorize and systematize doctrines of 
the first two collections and that were purportedly spoken by the Buddha to 
his mother during a three-month sojourn in the heaven of Trāyastriṃśa. 
Following the recital of each text, the assembled arhats agreed with it or 
made corrections, and at the conclusion of the council the canon was 
declared closed. No further texts would be admitted as the “word of the 
Buddha.” This canon was passed on orally from generation to generation for 
several centuries and then written down. It used a language called Pāli, and 
so is generally referred to as the “Pāli canon.” It is divided into three 
“baskets” (piṭaka): discourses, monastic discipline, and higher doctrine. 
 Despite the canonizing aspirations of these monks, new texts 
appeared in India, and as the religion spread to other countries new 
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apocryphal “sūtras” were composed. Some of these made their way back to 
India, and along with indigenous apochrypha created exegetical issues for 
Buddhist thinkers. For the Theravāda tradition (the dominant Buddhist 
school in Southeast Asia), the central concern was distinguishing what the 
Buddha actually said from spurious compositions attributed to him. 
Theravāda prides itself on being the most conservative Buddhist tradition 
and restricts its scriptures to the Pāli canon. All other texts attributed to the 
Buddha are regarded as inauthentic. 
The Pāli canon contains some statements by the Buddha that provide 
guidelines for exegetes. In the Great Instruction Discourse (Mahāpadesa-
sutta, traditionally attributed to the Buddha but probably composed after his 
death), he advises his followers to compare new teachings with those they 
heard previously; if the contents agree with the doctrine and monastic 
discipline they already know, then they can be regarded as authentic. In this 
formulation, a restrictive hermeneutic is proposed: new material should be 
evaluated in light of the established canon, and deviant notions should be 
rejected. It is important to qualify this, however: there is no suggestion that 
Buddhists who lack a thorough knowledge of the Buddha’s teachings will be 
able to conduct such enquiries, and the text assumes that only learned senior 
monks will do so. Ordinary Buddhists will presumably rely on such 
authorities. 
The other guideline was given to Ānanda, who expressed concern 
about future proliferation of new teachings attributed to the Buddha. In 
response, he was told that “whatever is well spoken is the word of the 
Buddha” (Aṅguttara-nikāya IV.163). As interpreted by the commentators, 
this implies that if a teaching contributes to the goals of Buddhist 
soteriology—mainly diminution of suffering, promotion of happiness, 
undermining of ignorance and mental affliction, and liberation from cyclic 
existence (saṃsāra)—then it can be viewed as Buddhist, regardless of who 
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initially propounded it. This expansive principle potentially leaves the door 
open for future additions to the canon, but Theravāda commentators have 
maintained a closed canon down to the present day. New texts may be read 
and studied, but only those traditionally contained in the three baskets are 
the word of the Buddha. 
A third noteworthy directive regarding competing claims to authority 
is found in the Pāli Discourse to the Kālamas (Kālama-sutta), in which the 
Buddha is approached by a group of people who express confusion with 
respect to the many claims by religious teachers of the day. Each propounds 
a particular system and dismisses those of all rivals, and each is well 
regarded by a particular group of disciples, but they all appear diminished by 
their unseemly sectarian rhetoric. Rather than simply asserting that his 
teachings are superior to theirs and denouncing his competitors, the Buddha 
advised the Kālamas to examine truth claims for themselves: those that 
accord with empirical evidence are most likely to be valid. Moreover, if one 
puts them into practice and derives positive results, this confirms their 
validity.  
This passage is often cited by contemporary Buddhists as evidence 
that the Buddha propounded an empirical and pragmatic approach to 
scriptural interpretation and wanted his followers to decide such matters for 
themselves through reasoning, each arriving at a personal realization based 
on individual examination. But they only mention the first section and 
ignore what follows. It goes on to advise the Kālamas to discern whether or 
not a particular teaching is accepted by “the wise” and to base their final 
decisions on this. There is an implicit appeal to authority: “the wise” are 
obviously not those who disagree with the Buddha or propound divergent 
doctrines and practices. Ultimately the directive of this passage resonates 
with those of the previous two, because validity is correlated to congruence 
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with already canonized teachings and subjected to the judgments of 
authoritative figures. 
Mahāyāna Hermeneutics 
While the Theravāda tradition has been conservative with regard to the 
canon, new texts continued to appear in India, and other schools accepted 
them as authentic. The most important wave of new scriptures is generally 
referred to as “Mahāyāna” (Greater Vehicle). This originated sometime 
around the first century C.E., and during successive centuries many new 
sūtras were composed, claiming to have been spoken by the historical 
Buddha, even though he had been dead for centuries. The chronological 
discrepancy was explained away by asserting that these texts were only given 
to the most advanced disciples and were hidden in the undersea realm of 
nāgas until the proper time for their wider dissemination. This required the 
appearance of human sages with the requisite insight to interpret these 
higher teachings, the most important of whom was Nāgārjuna (c. late second 
century C.E.).  
The Mahāyāna sūtras accepted the discourses of the Pāli canon as 
authentic teachings of the Buddha, but relegated them to a secondary and 
inferior status. They are characterized as introductory instructions for 
people of limited capacity, and those who followed them were adherents of 
the “Inferior Vehicle” (Hīnayāna). Mahāyāna teachings, by contrast, were 
delivered to the most advanced practitioners. Some Mahāyāna sūtras 
portray the Buddha as a skilled physician who prescribed the correct remedy 
for every spiritual affliction. Just as a competent doctor does not provide the 
same medicine to every patient, but expertly diagnoses his or her specific 
affliction and applies the most effective antidote, so the Buddha delivered 
different teachings to people of varying capacities, adapting his message to 
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what they needed to hear and what would be most beneficial in each 
circumstance.  
This approach makes sense as soteriology, but creates significant 
problems for exegetes. If each discourse attributed to the Buddha was aimed 
at a specific person at a particular level of attainment, how do we determine 
his final thought? What is the bottom line for a practitioner, and what 
guidelines are available to make such a determination? Mahāyāna sūtras 
contain a variety of tropes to establish their superiority over other texts, the 
most pervasive of which are direct statements that a particular teaching 
contains the “definitive meaning” (nītārtha) while others are of 
“interpretable meaning” (neyārtha).  
In some cases previous discourses are mentioned and dismissed as 
provisional, and the present one is declared to be the Buddha’s final 
thought, but the Tibetan scholar Tsong Khapa (1357-1419) states that mere 
scriptural testimony provides insufficient grounds for making such 
determinations. There are numerous claims of definitive status in Buddhist 
scriptures, and in some cases a particular teaching is declared to be 
definitive in one text and then relegated to inferior status in another. Thus, 
Tsong Khapa contends, Buddhists must examine doctrinal statements for 
themselves in order to ascertain what the Buddha’s true intention was.  
He advocates the use of “stainless reasoning” as the only viable tool 
for sorting out the Buddha’s thought. He compares the process to the way a 
goldsmith cuts, rubs, and physically examines gold in order to determine its 
quality. Similarly, Buddhist exegetes should carefully consider teachings 
attributed to the Buddha with reasoning based on sound principles of 
analysis. Like the “Discourse to the Kālamas,” however, he adds that one 
should rely on authorities of greater wisdom, particularly the “openers of 
the chariot ways” (shing rta) Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. The former is 
traditionally regarded as the founder of the Middle Way School 
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(Madhyamaka), and the latter is the main figure in the inception of the 
Yogic Practice School (Yogācāra). These are the two great philosophical 
traditions of Indian Buddhism. Thus reasoning is never truly independent or 
individual, but should always conform to traditional norms and follow 
established exegetical parameters. 
In his treatise Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying 
po), Tsong Khapa highlights hermeneutical schemes in two Indian 
Mahāyāna texts and contends that they represent the respective approaches 
to scriptural interpretation of the Middle Way School and the Yogic 
Practice School. The former tradition emphasizes logic and dialectical 
debate and takes the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñā-pāramitā) discourses as 
its main scriptural basis. Its primary emphasis is on the doctrine of 
emptiness (śūnyatā), according to which all phenomena lack any substantial 
essence (svabhāva); they are merely collections of parts brought into being 
by causes and conditions that change from moment to moment. Thus they 
are “dependently arisen” (pratītya-samutpāda). There is no enduring self, 
soul, or essential nature for anything, either persons or phenomena. This 
logic is extended to doctrines and philosophical notions, and even the 
Buddha’s teachings are declared to be words spoken for heuristic reasons, 
but ultimately empty of inherent existence.  
Madhyamaka philosophers developed a powerful critique of rival 
philosophical systems. They examined non-Buddhist traditions as well as 
rival Buddhist schools, subjecting them to a reductio ad absurdum analysis 
that demonstrated the conceptual limitations of their systems while refusing 
to propound an alternative view that would in turn become reified as 
“truth.” Instead, the Mādhyamikas took seriously the implications of the 
doctrine of emptiness and declared that all philosophical views rest on 
unsupportable assumptions and are subject to internal contradictions. This, 
they declared, is the Buddha’s final thought, and all of his teachings are 
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intended to lead his followers to a direct, non-conceptual realization of this 
insight.  
Madhyamaka hermeneutics relies primarily on the Discourse Spoken 
by Akṣayamati (Akṣayamati-nirdeśa-sūtra), which considers the problem of 
determining the Buddha’s final thought from among the plethora of 
competing doctrines and the vast number of canonical texts. The solution it 
proposes is apparently simple: the definitive teachings are those that relate 
to emptiness, which is the final nature of all phenomena. When the Buddha 
discusses emptiness, he only does so with his most advanced disciples, and 
he reveals his ultimate message to them. If the primary subject is emptiness, 
one can be certain that this is the Buddha’s authoritative word on the 
matter. The problem with this approach is that discussions of emptiness are 
not all compatible in Indian Mahāyāna literature, and the Buddha takes a 
number of divergent philosophical paths in discussions of emptiness. In 
practice, then, exegetes generally rely on a particular text or group of texts 
that are regarded as definitive within their respective traditions, generally in 
conjunction with commentaries the tradition has authorized as normative. 
For Mādhyamikas, the most important scriptures are the Perfection of 
Wisdom sūtras, and the philosophical texts of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti (c. 
seventh century) are the most respected commentaries. 
The other hermeneutical approach identified by Tsong Khapa is 
found in the Discourse Explaining the Thought (Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra), 
the main scriptural source of the Yogic Practice School, which was probably 
composed around the third century. It provides a novel approach to 
discerning the Buddha’s final thought: in it the Buddha reflects on his 
previous teachings and declares that they can be divided into three “wheels 
of doctrine,” each of which represents a cycle of related discourses given to a 
particular type of practitioner. The core doctrines associated with the Pāli 
canon, such as the four noble truths (suffering, its origin, its cessation, and 
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the path to eliminating it) and dependent arising, are the primary focus of 
the first wheel. They were taught to beginners—practitioners with limited 
cognitive capacities—and these people tended to reify the teachings and 
assign them a special truth status. Such disciples held to the literal reading of 
his words. Because they only understood the letter of the discourses and not 
their deeper meaning, they remained at a superficial level of 
comprehension.  
In order to counteract this tendency, the Buddha subsequently taught 
a “second wheel” that emphasized the doctrine of emptiness. The 
established categories of the scholastic philosophers were subjected to a 
thoroughgoing analysis that showed them to be ultimately empty—mere 
words and concepts lacking ultimate validity. They were spoken for heuristic 
purposes, but are not the Buddha’s final thought. The main texts of the 
second wheel are the Perfection of Wisdom discourses, some of which 
contain radical critiques of Buddhist doctrine and declare that the Buddha’s 
true intention can never be captured in words: it is only understood through 
spontaneous apprehension of the final nature of reality.  
The third wheel contains the Buddha’s definitive instructions. The 
Discourse Explaining the Thought declares that when the Buddha delivered 
first wheel teachings he knew that because of their limited capacities his 
audiences would reify his words and hold to the literal level of 
interpretation. For those of greater intelligence, he undermined this implicit 
tendency with second wheel teachings, which weaned some advanced 
followers from their dogmatic complacency and caused them to recognize 
the ultimate emptiness even of the Buddha’s words. This wheel also had 
inherent problems, however, and some disciples tended to move toward an 
extreme of nihilism that rejected existence in toto, and not merely inherent 
existence. In order to settle all the conceptual difficulties that arose from 
previous teachings, he delivered the third wheel—represented by the 
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Discourse Explaining the Thought—which contains the final word of the 
Buddha.  
From the context it is clear that not all Buddhist teachings fall into the 
three wheels schema. For example, instructions regarding monastic 
comportment, such as how to wear one’s robes or when to eat, cannot 
convincingly be assigned to any of the three wheels. Only certain contested 
doctrines are part of the three wheels schema, and the sūtra provides a 
paradigm for deciding which texts and teachings are included, and where 
they should be placed within its hierarchy. It also indicates a way to regard 
all of the multifarious texts attributed to the Buddha as having some value: 
each has a place within the hierarchy, and each was intended for a particular 
species of practitioner, providing the best possible instruction for each. 
Robert Thurman contends that the three wheels paradigm is based on 
a chronology of when particular teachings were delivered during the 
Buddha’s life, but this is rejected by Tsong Khapa and is at variance with 
how it is presented in the Sūtra Explaining the Thought.1 Rather, each wheel 
is a cycle of teaching. The articulation of one requires the prior explication 
of its predecessor, but biographies of the Buddha indicate that he spoke to 
various types of practitioners throughout his life and adapted his message to 
each. There is no indication that he only taught first wheel doctrines for the 
first part of his ministry, then switched to the second wheel, and later 
exclusively taught the third. The first wheel is appropriate to those for whom 
it was delivered, and the same is true of the others. According to the 
Discourse Explaining the Thought and Tsong Khapa, all three were part of 
his repertoire during his entire life. 
The Buddhist Hermeneutic Enterprise 
                                                
1 Robert Thurman, “Buddhist Hermeneutics”, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, XI.VI.1, 1978, pp. 19-21. 
Buddhist Hermeneutics  11 
When Indian Buddhism traveled to East Asia, interpreters faced similar 
problems to those of Indian exegetes. The Chinese canon contains a vast 
literature imported from India, and many of these texts claim to contain the 
Buddha’s final word. Like their Indian counterparts, East Asian Buddhists 
generally took a particular Indic text as the standard for the Buddha’s 
definitive thought and ranked other texts and doctrines in accordance with 
how closely they agreed with the primary scripture. Several schools created 
classification schemes (判教 panjiao), which generally held one text to be the 
norm and ranked others hierarchically. One of the most important of these 
was devised by Zhiyi (智顗, 538-597), who based his system on the Lotus 
Scripture of the True Doctrine (Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra) and arranged 
other texts and doctrines below it.   
In India and East Asia, Buddhist exegetes were mainly involved in 
what Hans-Georg Gadamer has labeled the “Romantic Endeavor,” an 
attempt to discern the intention of the purported author of their scriptures. 
For those who accept the voluminous literature credited to the Buddha as 
his actual words, the task of sorting through it to ascertain what he really 
meant is a monumental one. Few scholars ever attempted to read all of 
them, and most belonged to interpretive communities that valorized a 
particular work as definitive, and so their standard was ready-made. 
Someone in a Yogācāra lineage, for example, would learn that the Discourse 
Explaining the Thought is the final word of the Buddha and the norm for 
valid interpretation, and its schema would be applied in categorizing and 
reading other works (in conjunction with philosophical texts written by 
luminaries of the tradition). Throughout Buddhist history it has been 
assumed that competent exegetes are capable of correctly discerning the 
Buddha’s thought and reproducing it. This should ideally be based on a 
combination of academic study, instruction from authority figures, and 
personal realization based on meditative experience. Underlying the 
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enterprise is a conviction that ultimately the plethora of texts and doctrines 
attributed to the Buddha are part of a coherent whole that is internally 
consistent and the product of a perfected consciousness. As such, it is free 
from contradiction, and any apparent inconsistencies are reflections of the 
limitations of an individual interpreter. The Buddha only speaks the truth 
and makes no mistakes, and so his followers must find ways to reconcile any 
apparent difficulties in the teachings attributed to him.  
Contemporary scholars of a historical bent dismiss the claims of 
Buddhist tradition that all of the vast collections of texts believed to have 
been spoken by the Buddha by traditional Buddhists could have actually 
originated with him and conclude that they were composed by many 
different individuals with a range of sectarian intentions and redacted and 
augmented over the course of millennia.  
For faith communities that accepted as authentic the works of the Pāli 
canon, the hundreds of Mahāyāna scriptures contained in various canons, 
the Vinaya literature, the texts of the higher doctrine, and various other 
works contained in Indic scriptural collections, the sheer volume of this 
literature makes it virtually impossible to postulate convincing internal 
consistency. The obvious solution, one that was adopted by most thinkers, 
was to relegate most of it to the status of interpretable meaning and reserve 
definitive status for one text or a related corpus of works. The option of 
discarding texts regarded by their respective traditions as authoritative did 
not occur to any Buddhist thinker of whom I am aware; instead, all had to be 
taken seriously as the word of the Buddha and a place created for them. The 
Theravāda tradition rejected Mahāyāna works, and so only had to interpret 
the Pāli canon, but even this presented significant conceptual and doctrinal 
problems. For Mahāyāna philosophers, the task was significantly more 
difficult in light of the vast literature they inherited, containing thousands of 
texts claiming to have originated with the founder of the tradition, and 
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which they believed had been taught with a particular purpose and that 
constituted a part of the canon that could not simply be dismissed.  
Underlying all Buddhist hermeneutics is a conviction that these texts 
all make sense and are products of an awakened consciousness. The Buddha 
provided each audience with those teachings that would have the greatest 
soteriological benefit. Later interpreters were forced to try to make sense of 
these texts in terms of this assumption. Their efforts should ideally be 
guided by personal realization because the Buddhist path is not merely a 
conceptual abstraction, but rather a system of belief and practice designed 
to result in individual re-enactment of the Buddha’s experience of 
awakening.  
Ultimately hermeneutics is for those still on the path: in one famous 
analogy, the Buddha compares his teachings to a raft that is built in order to 
cross a river. When one has reached the other shore, it would be foolish to 
carry the raft on one’s back, because it has served its purpose. Similarly, a 
trainee on the path should rely on the guidance of more advanced 
practitioners and follow their instructions regarding which texts to view as 
normative and which practices to adopt. A buddha has no need for 
hermeneutical principles, because he or she can understand the definitive 
meaning of any scriptural statement. Advanced trainees are also credited 
with the ability to sort out merely interpretable statements and perceive the 
Buddha’s often hidden intention in delivering them. In the final analysis, 
interpretation may be guided by the principles of a particular philosophical 
system or faith community, but it is an initial stage of the path to awakening. 
At the level of buddhahood, all apparent contradictions vanish and intuitive 
understanding dawns. Thus hermeneutics is at best an approximation or 
adumbration of the perspective of a buddha. 
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